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Abstract
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France and in Europe from the 16th to the 18th centuries. Offices were bought because judges
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control of the judiciary. We develop a model of judicial venality and we rely on this model to
provide an analytic narrative of the rise and the decline of judicial venality in Old Regime France.
Historically, judicial venality improved French legal capacity despite limited opportunities to raise
taxes and borrow. But judicial venality also sharply increased legal diversity which, in addition to
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Fourthly, should public employments should be venal? They ought not, I think, in
despotic governments, where the subjects must be instantaneously placed or displaced
by the prince. But in monarchies this venality is not at all improper, by reason it
is an inducement to undertake that as a family employment, which would never be
undertaken through a motive of virtue; it fixes likewise every one to his duty, and
renders the several orders of the kingdom more permanent. Montesquieu (1748 [1989])
What can be more savage, than to see a nation where, by lawful custom, the office
of a judge is bought and sold, where judgments are paid for with ready money, and
where justice may legitimately be denied to him that has not the wherewithal to pay; a
merchandise in so great repute, as in a government to create a fourth estate of wrangling
lawyers, to add to the three ancient ones of the church, nobility, and people... Montaigne
(1564 [2004])
1 Introduction
Raising taxes to finance public goods is not always possible or desirable for a national ruler. For
instance, increasing taxes may entail granting a minimum of representation and political rights,
and thus sharing power. But instead of raising taxes, a ruler can let citizens directly pay for public
services and indirectly pay for public goods. To wit, what the ruler can do is sell public positions
and use the proceeds of the sales to provide public goods. In turn, buyers of public positions would
receive the fees paid by citizens to benefit from their services. Historically, this alternative path
to financing public expenditures was followed by Old Regime France through the sale of offices.
Venal offices notably included the entire judiciary and most legal professions. Venality was rife in
other parts of Europe from the 16th to the 18th century. It is a striking example of public service
privatization. Interestingly, while there have been mass privatization programs in many countries
in the last forty years, the judicial sector remains to a large extent publicly organized everywhere
(especially in Europe), even though alternative dispute resolution methods are more and more used
to resolve civil and commercial disputes. Developing countries which face difficulties in providing
public services often try to reproduce the current judicial systems of European countries, but not the
ones that helped the latter to build their legal capacity.
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This paper focuses on the advantages and defects of judicial venality. To do this we propose a
new model of legal design. We consider a ruler facing a broad set of judges, each of whom being
characterized by an intrinsic probability to favor a representative plaintiff. Each judge, however, is
inclined to further support the plaintiff since so doing increases both the number of suits and the
fees paid by litigants. But deviating from his intrinsic probability to support the plaintiff is also
costly for a judge. As a result, not all judges become pro-plaintiff. The ruler is also characterized by
his own probability to support the plaintiff and receives a share of the fees paid by litigants. For him,
there is a tradeoff between selling offices (which, in the model is equivalent to receiving a share of
the litigants’ fees) and losing control of the judiciary. We study this tradeoff and how it is affected
by a change in the distribution of judges’ characteristics. We show that increased the diversity in
the judges’ propensity to support the plaintiff may weaken the appeal of venality for the ruler.
Secondly, we rely on our model to provide an analytic narrative of the rise and the decline of venality
in Old Regime France.1 Venality was a successful policy in building state capacity, as it enabled the
French monarchy which initially had limited coercive power, to raise money from its subjects, and
increase the size of the state at the same time. But venality, in addition to making trials both costly
and lengthy, also reinforced legal diversity, which eventually caused its demise at the beginning of
the French Revolution.
This paper contributes to different strands of literature. It first contributes to the literature on legal
design, and more specifically addresses the issue of how to select and finance the judiciary.2 An
early paper on this issue is Allen (2005) who focuses on English legal history and analyzes how
to design public employment, including the judiciary, when there are monitoring problems. He
finds that resorting to office venality is useful whenever private incentives are aligned with the
ruler’s objectives. Where private incentives conflict with the ruler’s objectives, patronage is a better
choice. Here, the perspective is different since we concentrate on judicial venality per se and more
specifically on the determination of trial fees as well as how they are shared between the ruler and
the judges. We show that even when the ruler and the judges’ objectives are not aligned, the former
can benefit from judicial venality.
1Esteves (2015) also proposes a model of venality in Old Regime France. Esteves’ model, however, is different
from ours notably because it takes the values of the fees received by office holders as exogenous, whereas we try to
endogenize them.
2See Gaukrodger (2017) for a recent review of the different compensation systems for adjudicators.
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We also contribute to the study of the optimal degree of legal centralization (La Porta et al. (2008)).
To study this degree, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) pay attention to vertical conflicts of interests
between a central ruler and local agents. They notice that decentralized justice is sensitive to local
pressures, while centralized justice depends on the central ruler’s preferences.3 Comparing French
and English legal systems in the Middle Ages, they argue that France chose to let royal judges
make judicial decisions (leading later to a centralized legal system) because local lords feared their
neighbors more than the King. By contrast, England chose a system of juries (leading later to a
judge-made legal system) to counterbalance the overweening power of the King. These medieval
origins of today’s legal systems are criticized by Klerman and Mahoney (2007a) who show that
venality made French judges more independent of the King than their English counterparts. Another
criticism was made by Crettez et al. (2018) who contend that French legal centralization actually
began with the French Revolution and was an institutional response to the egalitarian aspirations of
citizens triggered by the Enlightenment. An alternative explanation for French legal centralization
is provided by Arruñada and Andonova (2005) who center on the alleged fact that at the end of the
18th century, local judges opposed free markets and contractual equality. Granting them judicial
discretion would have threatened the development of the economy which is why France chose legal
centralization and enacted the Napoleonic Civil Code in 1804. Arruñada and Andonova (2005),
however, do not consider judicial venality as such, nor do they highlight the tradeoff associated with
this system. In addition, by focusing on the Civil Code (1804), they overlook the fact that the bulk
of legal transformations occurred at the beginning of the French Revolution, from 1789 to 1791 (see
Blaufarb (2016)). In a different vein, legal centralization is also analyzed in relation to horizontal
conflicts of interests between private agents. The key tradeoff is that centralizing the production of
law diminishes the costs of legal diversity, but does not fulfill local preferences for specific rules.
In relation to this tradeoff, Loeper (2011) shows that legal uniformity can be Pareto-dominated by
legal diversity. Crettez et al. (2018) reconsider the tradeoff above by arguing that legal uniformity
can be desired per se because of aversion to inequality before the law. They show that there is a
threshold such that when the intensity of aversion to inequality before the law is below this threshold
legal decentralization is preferred to legal centralization (and conversely). They also show that the
3The subversion of legal institutions by the wealthy and the politically powerful is further addressed in Glaeser et al.
(2003).
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optimal way to balance the desire for local adjustments and national uniformity is to have uniform
rules that can be adapted by judges. Here, we follow a far less aggregated approach and we focus
on how to build state legal capacity.
Venality shares many characteristics with fee-based private justice, and therefore we also contribute
to the literature analyzing justice as a private good.4 To analyze the properties of fee-based justice,
we adapt the standard model of trial with optimistic litigants developed by Landes (1972), Shavell
(1982) and Barg-Gill (2005), inter alia, to take into account the case where judges received fees
from litigants. Landes and Posner (1979) argue that competition between judges should make
fee-based private justice efficient, and that it is always possible to control the trial costs by fixing the
fees values. We show that when competition between judges is weak, fee-based private justice has a
pro-plaintiff bias because it is the plaintiff who chooses to bring the case to the court. In addition,
judges can manage to extract large fees from litigants. As an example, in France Old regime venal
judges received extra fees by increasing the trial length. Our results complement those obtained by
Klerman (2007b) in his study of English fee-based justice before 1799. Indeed, he shows that this
system was biased toward plaintiffs in order to raise fees, a fact which was vigorously denounced
by Bentham. Venality, however, differs from a fee-based private justice in that the ruler sells offices
and uses the proceeds of the sale to finance public expenditures. In this connection, venality can
achieve a certain level of efficiency, albeit in ways that differ from those analyzed by Landes and
Posner (1979).
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on state capacity (see, e.g., Besley and Persson (2011),
Dincecco (2017), Johnson and Koyama (2017)). State capacity refers to the ability of a state to
provide public goods and services. It includes both fiscal and legal capacities. Fiscal capacity is
the state’s ability to raise the fiscal resources needed to finance the provision of public goods and
services, including justice, whereas legal capacity is its ability to define and enforce the rule of
law. Those capacities are intertwined. To wit, a minimal fiscal capacity is required to assure legal
capacity, which in turn increases the tax base and the ability to borrow (see Johnson and Koyama
(2014)). Stasavage (2003) argues that France borrowed at a higher interest rate than England
during the 18th century because its power to tax was impaired by the lack of parliamentary and
4Landes and Posner (1979) argue that “few economists realize that the provision of judicial services precedes the
formation of the state and that many formally public courts had important characteristics of private institutions.”
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representative institutions. Yet, early modern states like France devised ingenious ways to extract
resources from society without resorting to taxation. In this regard, venality helped the monarchy to
develop French legal capacity over time. In addition, the proceeds of the office sales financed other
expenditues, not least wars. At this time, often called Le Grand Siècle (the Great Century), France
was the most powerful country in Europe.
The remaining part of the paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we present our model of
litigation with judicial venality. We use this model in section 3 to study the interactions between a
national ruler and a large set of venal judges. Section 4 is devoted to a brief historical presentation of
judicial venality in French Old Regime. In section 5, we rely on our model to provide an analytical
narrative of the evolution of venality. Some concluding remarks are offered in section 6. All the
technical proofs are relegated to an appendix.
2 Judicial Venality and the Canonical Model of Litigation
Judicial venality has three distinctive features. Firstly, it is a fee-based system in which litigants
directly pay the trial costs to judges. Secondly, because judges buy their offices from the ruler, they
are relatively independent from him. Thirdly, when people pay trial fees they indirectly contribute to
the financing of the ruler’s expenditure. This is in contrast with the standard system where taxpayers
directly finance the provision of public goods and services (including payement of civil servants).
Our model of venality aims at capturing these three features. In this section we focus on the first
feature by introducing judicial venality in the canonical model of civil litigation.5 We next briefly
recall this model before adapting it to take venality into account.
2.1 The canonical model of litigation
Consider two optimistic litigants, a plaintiff and a defendant, who meet a venal judge. Let pe be
the expected probability perceived by the two litigants that the plaintiff will win his lawsuit (this
probability is common knowledge and will turn out to be judge dependent). Let Cp denote the cost
of the lawsuit for the plaintiff, and Cd the cost for the defendant.
5The model also applies to commercial litigation.
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If the plaintiff wins the lawsuit, the defendant pays his own costs and a share γ of the trial costs
borne by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff loses the lawsuit, he pays his own costs and a share α of the
defendant’s trial costs. The expected cost kp of a lawsuit for the plaintiff is then
kp =Cp(1− γ p
e)+Cdα(1− p
e), (1)







While both litigants expect the plaintiff to win his lawsuit with probability pe, they have different
estimates of the sum that the defendant is ordered to pay if the plaintiff is victorious. Let Dp and Dd
be the plaintiff and the defendant’s estimates, respectively, where Dd < Dp. This inequality reflects
both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s optimism. It means that the plaintiff expects to receive an
amount larger than the sum that the defendant expects to give.
Under the foregoing assumptions, the expected gains of the plaintiff and the defendant are as follows
Up = p
eDp − kp, (3)
Ud =−p
eDd − kd. (4)
To avoid paying litigation costs, the parties can negotiate an out-of-court settlement.6 Pre-trial
bargaining is chosen over a lawsuit whenever the expected loss of the defendant is larger than the
expected gain of the plaintiff, that is
peDp − kp < p
eDd + kd. (5)
Parties file suit whenever condition (5) does not hold. This is the case when the sum of litigation
6We assume that forum shopping is impossible.
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costs are no greater than the expected difference in the claim values
Cp +Cd ≤ p
e(Dp −Dd). (6)
2.2 Litigation and venality
In contrast to the standard model of litigation, venal judges earn the trial fees paid by litigants.7
Suppose that a judge can choose the values of Cp and Cd of the trial fees (section 5 presents evidence
that Old regime judges chose the trial fees by controlling the trial length). Then the judge will
extract all the surplus of the trial by choosing the value of Cp+Cd that makes the litigants indifferent
between going to court and negotiating an out-of-court settlement, i.e.,
Cp +Cd = p
e(Dp −Dd). (7)
Of course, a judge should also make sure that the plaintiff is not worse off when filing a suit, i.e.,
kp ≤ p
eDp, (8)




Notice, however, that any pair (Cp,Cd) satisfying condition (7) also satisfies condition (9).8
A judge would be better off by further favoring the plaintiff, namely, acting in such a way that
pe = 1. Yet, it is unlikely that all judges would give full support to the plaintiff. To see this, assume
that in the absence of venality, the probability of favoring a plaintiff differs from one judge to
another (this probability may depend, for example, on unclear laws, variations in courts’ information,
or interpretations, political views, local customs and so on). Call this probability the natural, or
intrinsic probability of favoring a plaintiff. The values of this natural propensity are distributed over
7Not all the litigation fees are actually received by judges. For instance, litigants must also pay their lawyers and so
on. For simplicity, we only consider the fees paid to judges.
8That is because both 1− γ pe and α(1− pe) are lower than one.
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the set [0, p] according to a probability distribution function F which has a density f .
Furthermore, suppose that the cost for judge i of deviating from his natural probability of favoring a






where ρ is a positive parameter.9 This overall cost includes the cost of deviating from one personal
opinion, the cost of deviating from the law as it is commonly perceived, the cost of being overturned







It turns out that no judge would give full support to the plaintiff wherever ρ is large enough.
2.3 Venal judges and the ruler
Venal judges bought their offices at a price Po. Owning a judicial office enabled judges to obtain
fees from litigants, as well as continuing payment from the ruler. Let ft and gt be the trial fees and
the payment received by a judge at each date t, respectively. Also assume that these terms remain
constant over time. Then one can show that choosing the values Po and gt boils down to choosing
the share φ of the trial fees accruing to the ruler (the judges receiving a share 1−φ of the fees).10
Therefore, there is no loss of generality in focusing on this share and ignoring the determination of
Po and gt .
In relation to the trial studied in the foregoing subsection, the judge’s net gain is given by (1−











This solution depends on pi, the judge’s propensity to favor the plaintiff absent venality, and is given




Proposition 1. A venal judge whose natural propensity to favor the plaintiff is pi actually favors









ρ (Dp −Dd) if pi ≤ 1−
(1−φ)
ρ (Dp −Dd) ,
1, otherwise.
(13)
Clearly, the probability pe(pi) increases with pi and Dp −Dd (the difference in the assessment of
damages by the litigants), and decreases with φ (the share of the trial fees accruing to the ruler)
as well as ρ (the cost of deviating from one’s natural propensity to favor the plaintiff). Thus, the
fee-based feature of venality creates a pro-plaintiff bias, that the ruler can reduce by increasing his
share φ of the trial fees.





This assumption ensures that judge p, who is the most inclined to favor the plaintiff, will not always
decide the case in his favor, even if he can keep all the fees paid by the litigants. To put it another
way, pe(pi) will always be strictly lower than one. Such a property will considerably simplify the
foregoing analysis of the interactions between the ruler and the judges, without affecting our results
qualitatively.
3 Legal Design and the Venality of Judicial Offices
This section addresses the optimal design of judicial venality from the ruler’s viewpoint. We first
consider the ruler’s payoff. Then, we study the choice between venality of judicial offices and a
legal system where the ruler directly controls judges’ decisions.
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3.1 The ruler’s payoff
Assume that all trials can be described by the model of the preceding section. Recall that there is a
representative plaintiff who estimates that the representative defendant owes him Dp, whereas the
defendant estimates his liability to be Dd . Also recall that there is a continuum of judges whose
natural propensities pi to favor the plaintiff belong to [0,1]. Now assume that the ruler has his own
opinion about the right probability to favor the plaintiff, which we denote by pR, and that the cost




2, with ψ > 0.










2 f (pi)d pi. (15)
In the expression above the first term represents the trial fees received by the judges that are paid
back to the ruler. The greater these fees, the higher the ruler’s payoff. The value of these fees
notably depends on the distribution of the judges’ natural propensities pi to favor the plaintiff. The
more the distribution is concentrated on higher values of pi, the greater the fees and the income
received by the ruler.
The second part of the ruler’s payoff represents the cost of having independent judges deciding
cases on the basis of their own preferences and not on the ruler’s. The parameter ψ is the relative
cost of deviation from pR in terms of the ruler’s income.
3.2 The case for the venality of judicial offices
Let us assume that where there is no venality of judicial offices, the ruler receives no fees but can
control the judiciary and force judges to favor the plaintiff with a probability equal to pR. Thus,
pe(pi) = pR for all p and it holds that WR = 0.11










2 f (pi)d pi ≥ 0. (16)
11Actually, WR is likely to be negative since the ruler is unlikely to control all the judges’ decisions. Besides, judges
must be paid, and the ruler, who is reluctant to raise taxes, will have to rely on his own resources.
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where E[pe(p)] is the expected value of the pe(pi) and V [pe(p)] is their variance.
Inspecting the value of WR in (17) we see that the venality of judicial offices is more likely to be
chosen
- where the variance of the actual propensities to favor the plaintiff V [pe(p)] is low (holding
E [pe(p)] constant);
- where the ruler’s preferred propensity pR nears the expected propensities of judges to favor
the plaintiff E [pe(p)];
- where the relative cost of the deviation ψ is small.
3.3 Optimal levy on trial fees
Assume that condition (16) is fulfilled and that the ruler chooses φ to maximize his payoff WR(φ),
where WR(φ) is obtained from equation (15). The next Proposition gives the optimal value of the
levy φ on trial fees.
































The optimal value of φ is no lower than zero, because WR(0)< 0. More precisely, choosing a levy
equal to zero obviously yields no income, and nor does it ensure that judges’ propensities to favor
the plaintiff are equal to pR: in that case, not choosing venality of judicial offices is the best solution.
The optimal value of φ can also be lower than one. To understand why, consider the case where the
ruler sets φ equal to 1 and suppose that he contemplates the effect of a marginal decrease in φ by an
amount ε . Notice that when φ = 1, judges no longer specially favor the plaintiffs (that is, beyond
their natural propensity to do so) and the ruler receives the total value of the trial fees. When the
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levy on trial fees decreases by a small amount, the ruler receives a marginally lower share of the
total value of the trial fees. But a marginal decrease in φ also leads judges to favor the plaintiffs
slightly more. When the judges’ expected natural propensities to favor the plaintiff are lower than
the preferred value of the ruler, a marginal decrease in φ makes every judge’s propensities pe(pi)
closer to pR. That shift decreases the ruler’s cost for the deviation of judges’ decisions from pR.
When the second effect dominates the former, the ruler is better off reducing the levy on trial fees.
Finally, observe that φ∗ increases with the expected value of the judges’ propensity to favor the
plaintiff E[pi] and decreases with the ruler’s propensity pR.
3.4 Country size and venality
How does the ruler’s payoff relate to the size of his country? A larger country a priori needs more
judges than a smaller one. Therefore, the ruler of a large country can sell more offices and receive
more trial fees compared to what he would get were the country smaller. But judges’ characteristics
can also be more diverse in larger countries and the cost for the ruler of the decisions made by
independent venal judges may increase according to the size of his country. As a result, it is possible
that the larger the country, the smaller the ruler’s payoff.
More formally assume that the size of the country is initially normalized to one and increases to L> 1.
Assume also that the proportion of judges of types i in [pi, pi +d pi] is given by g(pi)d piL (instead
of f (pi)d pi before the expansion of the country). For simplicity, suppose that the distributions F
and G have the same means.12 We then obtain the next result
Proposition 3. Assume that distributions F and G of judges’ natural propensities to favor the
















−ψ (LVG(pi)−VF(pi)) . (19)
12Notice that whenever the distributions of judges’ characteristics F and G have the same mean, Proposition 2 ensures
that the optimal value of φ is independent of the country size.
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Thus a sharp rise in the cost associated with an increase in judges’ heterogeneity (the last term in the
above expression) may outweigh the increase in the value of the trial fees received by the ruler.13
We shall use Proposition 3 to propose an analytical narrative of the evolution of the French Old
Regime practice of venality. We summarize the main features of this practice beforehand.
4 French Old Regime and the Venality of Judicial Offices
Financing public expenditure through the sale of offices was by no means a French exception. That
was current practice in Germany, England, Spain, Venice, the Papal states and so on. In France,
however, the sale of offices appears to have been the most considerable and to have lasted the longest.
Office venality was instrumental in the building of state capacity (and notably legal capacity) and
remained in use until the very last days of the monarchy. This section briefly presents the origins
of venality, then focuses on judicial offices before briefly studying the costs of venality and the
attempts at reforming it.
4.1 Adoption and development of office venality in France
Saint-Bonnet and Sassier (2011) (p. 233) assert that at least since the end of the 13th century, a new
royal tax was considered legitimate insofar it had been formally accepted by the common people.
In the 14th and 15th centuries, acceptance was given by the General Estates, a general assembly
representing the French estates of the realm.14 Yet, during the rise of the absolute monarchy (from
1614 to 1789), French kings avoided summoning the General Estates. Therefore, it was difficult
to raise taxes, and since the French monarchy was considered a bad debtor, issuing public debt
was no easier. Despite increased fiscal capacity over time (see Johnson and Koyama (2014)), the
French monarchy actually faced a persistent default risk until its demise (see Velde and Weir (1992)
for the period from 1746 to 1793). Venality was hence a means used by the monarchy to develop
13Notice that the assumptions made in the Proposition are satisfied when the distribution function F is second-order
stochastically dominant over the distribution function G. That is
∫ p′
0 F(p)d p <
∫ p′
0 G(p)d p, ∀p
′ ∈]0, p[. This implies
that the variance VG(pi) of the natural propensities pi with G is higher than VF(pi) and that the means of the two
distributions are equal.
14Those estates included the clergy (the First Estate), the nobility (the Second Estate), and the commoners (the Third
Estate). The commoners, however, were not democratically elected. They were mainly guild members, bourgeois, and
officers who stood out from the people by their wealth, influence or status.
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administrative institutions under constantly tight budget constraints (Reinhard (1998), Descimon
(2006)). Office venality was not only an expeditious way to develop state capacity. According to
Montesquieu, venality was also an effective means to allocate public offices under a monarchy
because it prevented clientelism, favoritism and nepotism.15
Beginning in the absence of any clear legal framework under the reigns of Francis I and Henry
IV during the 16th century, office venality was progressively given sound legal foundations. 16
What was only a financial expedient in years deeply affected by the wars in Italy and the civil war
became a central institution of the monarchy and remained until its fall in 1789, when venality was
completely abolished (Bien (1987)).
According to Mousnier (1970) (p. 2) and Nagle (2008), French administration was much more
developed during the Old Regime than it was during the medieval period. While the number of
stable positions in the royal administration was around 300 at the end of the Middle Ages (and
included only a few dozen for the King’s Council, the main organ of power, Harsgor (1980)), there
were at least 4000 officers (of whom 1500 judges) in 1515, and 46 000 in 1665 (among whom
9000 judges).17 With the progressive centralization of power, delivering justice gradually evolved
from a duty of local lords to one of the main missions of the King (Olivier-Martin (2005), p. 518).
After giving an official framework to venality in 1523, Francis I laid the foundations of the new
public service of justice. The very nature of the judiciary was modified. While in England lay
judges survived in many courts, in France “through the last three centuries of the Old Regime, the
displacement of lay by professional judges was almost everywhere complete” (Dawson (1960), p.
69). Officers were independent from the King but they remained public servants in the sense that the
monarch could withdraw the title to the office from his holder (albeit with financial compensation)
in the event of abuse of authority, prevarication or death.
With venality, the number of judges increased, which made it possible to provide justice on a
larger scale. The country was increasingly covered by new courts. In 1552, Henri II created 60
15Richelieu, quoted by Doyle (1992) also argued that “The system of offices destroyed the power of aristocratic
clientage, eliminated corruption by introducing publicity, and gave to the rich a vested interest in supporting the
government.”
16Pinsard (2018) and Pinsard and Tadjeddine (2019) analyze how the market for offices was progressively imple-
mented in France during the 16th century.
17By contrast, Royer et al. (2016), (p. 113) estimates the number of judges in modern France to be 8500 for a
population which is more than three times that of the Old Regime.
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new présidiaux (local courts), see Figure 1. Some provincial Parliaments were also created later,
reaching 14 at the end of the Old Regime. Inside any given court, activity was on the rise. As an
example, Figure 2 gives the number of appeal trials for criminal justice over a century in the area of
the Parliament of Paris.
Figure 1: Local courts created in 1552 (from
Claerr (2008))
Figure 2: Criminal trials by the Parliament of
Toulouse (from Viala (1953), p. 213)
.
4.2 Office acquisition
Acquisition of offices followed a standard pattern. New or vacant offices were sold by public auction.
A buyer would pay the price (the "finance") to a special Treasury department. He could later sell
his title or pass it on to his heir: offices were considered as private property. They were bought
for two reasons. Firstly, buying an office was a way to obtain a more honorable social position18
and even in some cases to obtain a title of nobility.19 This explains why the demand for offices
was continuously high. As commented by Pontchartrain, a minister of Louis XIV: “Each time the
King of France creates an office, God immediately creates an idiot to buy it.” (Royer et al. (2016)).
Secondly, officers received two types of income. The first one, called “gages”, was paid by the King,
albeit intermittently. Gages were totally independent from the officers’ level of activity. The second
one, called “epices” for officers of justice, depended on the officers’ activity. Epices consisted of
18See Deffains et al. (2020) for a presentation and an estimate of the price of social status in the French Old Regime.
19As a result, office venality came to be known as the “polishing brush for commoners” (Royer et al. (2016), p. 123).
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trial fees paid to judges for performing tasks like cases studies, enquiries, information gathering and
so on.
4.3 Legal procedures
During the Old Regime, legal procedures differed from one local court to another (they were referred
to as “the style of the court”), although they had much in common. The Code of civil procedure
introduced in 1667 standardized procedures over the kingdom, but did not achieve legal unification.
We next rely on this code to give a brief account of a civil trial.20
A plaintiff would bring a lawsuit against a defendant by resorting to a bailiff. The latter would then
transmit the lawsuit to the president of the court. If the president deemed the lawsuit acceptable, it
was registered in the list of coming trials (the role). Each rank in the list corresponded to a specific
judge. Then each party would hire a prosecutor (in addition to lawyers), whose task was to make
sure that procedural formalities were complied with. Prosecutors could always try to negotiate a
pre-trial settlement agreement. Short of this agreement, a first hearing would take place.21 During
the first hearing, the judge in charge of the trial would decide whether the case was a simple or
a complex one. When the case was considered simple, the judge could make a decision (and
accordingly, earn a limited value of the trial fees). When the case was considered complex, the
judge could ask the litigants to supply additional trial materials. Each additional item had to be paid
for by the parties to the judiciary. Once the trial materials had been collected and processed, the
judge could finally hand down a decision. However, to obtain a written trace of the judgment, the
parties had yet to pay a supplementary fee. The trial procedure corresponded roughly to the modern
one, except that the parties had to remunerate the court and its staff directly. Figure 3 summarizes
the conduct of a trial.
20For a more thorough presentation, see Fréger (2006) and Feutry (2013).
21The defendant had the right not to come to the hearing. But in that case, the judge adjudicated in favor of the
plaintiff.
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Figure 3: French Standard Civil Procedure in 1667
4.4 The costs of venality
Old Regime civil justice was frequently deemed both costly and lengthy.22 Judges exploited
the specificities of local customs and legal procedures to request many documents from litigants
and thereby increased the trial fees. Further, as stated by Hamscher (1976) (quoted by Johnson
and Koyama (2014), p. 80), venality and the growing number of offices resulted in “perennial
jurisdictional conflicts among the courts and in a great expense to litigants who faced a vast judicial
hierarchy if they were entitled to appeal a decision from a lower court.” In a different vein Carbasse
(2014) (p. 206) considers that France was also characterized by “an excessive diversity of judgments
- with an excessive diversity of jurisprudence from one place to another.” Venality of offices was
a key factor in this diversity, because venal judges could freely interpret laws which were often
obscure and contradictory.
The demand for simplified and standardized legal procedures to render trials cheaper and shorter
was expressed from the beginnings of venality until its end. Judges’ greed was deeply ingrained
in the collective imagination, as can be seen in the famous writings of Rabelais (2004) or Racine
(1668). It was less and less tolerated during the 18th century, in an era marked by the Enlightenment
(Crettez et al. (2018)). As a consequence, there was a constant demand for the standardization of
French legal procedures (Halperin (1992), p. 47). This standardization was notably considered as
much more important than the unification of civil laws (Dauchy (2006)).
22Criminal justice was plagued by the same defects.
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4.5 Attempts at reforming the judicial venality
Most of the reforms attempted to limit the negative effects of venality without completely removing
it, because that was politically too costly. The first major reform of venality was undertaken by
Louis XIV, who gave his minister Colbert the task of reducing legal uncertainty and the costs borne
by litigants.23 As a result of Colbert’s efforts, Louis XIV enacted in 1667 the Ordonnance Civile,
a comprehensive code regulating civil procedure, also known as the Code Louis.24 The preamble
of the code explicitly stated that the arbitrariness of courts resulted in lengthy and costly trials
leading in turn to the ruin of families. Legal diversity was seen as a source of disorder and it was
the monarch’s duty to limit it (Saint-Bonnet and Sassier (2011), p. 386). To reduce legal diversity,
the Code Louis restricted judges’ freedom to determine the value of trial fees and procedural length.
Moreover, it was no longer possible to interpret royal laws.
Despite its ambition, Colbert’s reform had limited effects due to venality judges remained inde-
pendent from the King.25 In particular, they continued to rely on local customs to justify their
decisions.26 Moreover, in local superior courts, local customs continued to take precedence over
royal ordinances until the end of the Old Regime (Wijffels (2014), p. 142). Consequently, there
were also some attempts at unifying customs into a sort of “common law”, but to no avail. As
summarized by Carey (1981), those reforms did not penetrate to the roots of the problem, namely
mingling finance and justice (p. 50).
Later on, d’Aguessau, Chancelier of King Louis XV, furthered the harmonization of legal decisions
made by local courts, the number of which he also wanted to halve (Carey (1981), p. 54). But only
a small number were abolished, because of the successful opposition of venal, and thus independent,
judges (Carey (1981), p. 60). The subsequent major reform directly attempted to abolish venality
and ensure free access to justice (Doyle (1997), p. 258). In April 1771, Maupeou, a minister of
Louis XV, bought back many offices and introduced a new system where judges were nominated
23In 1665 Colbert identified more than 30 000 judicial offices and estimated that at most 8000 judges were actually
needed (Doyle (2000)).
24While Colbert had wished to unify larger parts of the law, Louis XIV only wanted to reform legal procedures. In
addition to the Code Louis, a code of criminal procedures was introduced in 1670.
25However, Colbert bought back 20,000 offices at fixed reimbursement prices that were below their market values
(Doyle (2000)).
26The use of local customs to limit the application of central legislation was well understood by the revolutionary
decision-makers, who completely eliminated venality as well as customs as a source of the law (Crettez et al. (2018)).
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and paid by the King (Villers (1937)). This reform met strong local political opposition and was
actually canceled when the King died in 1774, despite improvements in judicial efficiency (Villers
(1937)). Yet public support for venality continuously decreased over time and only a few people
actually supported it by the end of the 18th century (Doyle (1997)).
Office venality was fully removed at the beginning of the French Revolution (Lafon (2001)). The
reform of the judiciary was among the first tasks undertaken by the newly created National Assembly.
Judges became ordinary civil servants, paid by the State, and had to strictly apply the legislation
made by a central parliament. They were not allowed to interpret the law or rely on local customs.
This, however, proved impractical. A more flexible legislation was introduced by Napoléon later
on, including the Code civil (1804) and the Code de procédure civile (1806). In this regard, it is
worthy of note that the codification of civil procedures promoted by the Emperor was inspired by
the codification of civil procedures achieved in 1667.27
5 An analytical narrative of judicial venality in the Old Regime
We now rely on the model studied in sections 2 and 3 to provide an analytical narrative of the
evolution of judicial venality in Old Regime France. We first discuss the historical relevance of key
assumptions used in the model.
Judges’ independence
We have assumed that venal judges are independent of the ruler and can make decisions that differ
from what he wishes. That assumption is supported by historical evidence. For instance, Klerman
and Mahoney (2007a) state that “venality made French judges more independent than their English
counterparts.”28 They even argue that “judicial insulation from political oversight reached an
excessive level.” With regard to the French Revolution, they contend that "an important goal of
revolutionary reforms was to reduce the judges’ power and independence.”
Absence of forum shopping
27Treilhard, one of the four fathers of the Civil code, stated that a code of civil procedures was necessary to prevent
judges from slowing trials or making arbitrary decisions.
28This is in contrast with Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) who underline the King’s control over French justice.
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Forum shopping is impossible in our model. To put it another way, judges do not compete with each
other and the absence of competition enables them to set large trial fees. What limits these fees
is the possibility that litigants might negotiate an out-of-court settlement. During the Old Regime,
competition between judges was limited. That was because, as was already mentioned, lawsuits
were registered in the list of coming trials, and each rank in the list corresponded to a specific
judge. Choosing a particular judge was therefore difficult. Yet, to bring a lawsuit, it was sometimes
possible to substitute an ecclesiastical court (or a seigniorial court) for a royal one. This alternative,
however, had the same deterrent effect as an out-of-court settlement. It limited, but did not cancel,
judges’ power to set large trial fees.
Trial fee sharing
In our model, the ruler determines φ , i.e. the share of trial fees that accrue to him. There are no
office sales per se. During the Old Regime, however, offices were sold on a primary market and
were characterized by their prices and the level of gages that came with them. Yet, the King had
the discretionary power to modify the value of these gages and he actually not always paid them.
Moreover, officers were sometimes forced to pay extra fees in order to keep their offices. Therefore,
our assumption that the ruler can choose the value of φ by determining a combination of the office
sale price, the values of gages and mandatory payments, echoes with what French Kings did.
We now discuss some implications of the model regarding Old Regime venality.
Pro-plaintiff bias
Proposition 1 states that venal judges have a pro-plaintiff bias. It is difficult, however, to measure
this bias directly and thus ascertain whether French judges were pro-plaintiff biased. Yet, where
judges tend to favor the plaintiffs there should be a large number of trials. That was precisely the
case in the last centuries of the Ancien Regime. Going to court was a “French passion”: there
were as many trials in France as in other European countries (Nagle (2008)). A somewhat indirect
empirical evidence of the pro-plaintiff bias is provided by Klerman (2007b) for England, which had
fee-based justice until 1799. By comparing judicial decision-making before and after the statutory
reform that took fees away from the judges, he finds that on average judges ruled more for the
plaintiff before the reform.
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Costly trials
The study of our model has shown that where competition between judges is weak, each of them is
able to receive significant fees from litigants. As far as the Old Regime is concerned, it is difficult
to give an estimate of the trial costs (see Fréger (2006)). But there is a broad consensus as to the
idea that trials were expensive. For instance, Marion (1969), p. 212, considers that “without any
doubt, justice fees were considerable.” Croix (1930) presents the details of the expenses incurred
by a clothier who went to court to defend the rights of his corporation at the Parliament of Dijon
and shows that he made numerous payments to the different members of the judiciary. More
precisely, according to Guenee (1963), the costs of a trial without an appeal ranged from 3 to 50
livres tournoi.29 A trial with an appeal to the Parliament of Paris could cost up to 500 livres tournoi.
These figures are not consistent with Landes and Posner (1979)’s claim that it is always possible to
limit trial costs by fixing the rates of judicial acts. While in the Old Regime epices did have a fixed
value (Fréger (2006)), the degree of complexity of a trial was at the judges’ discretion and it was
fairly easy for them to increase it in order to make trials costlier.
Lenghty trials
Because trials were often complex, they could also be lengthy. Trials with an oral decision were
short, but those with a written decision were longer, many of them lasting several years. Even a
simple trial with a written decision never lasted less than two years and a half (Guenee (1963),
p. 244). Some evidence is also provided by the pre-revolutionary cahiers de doléances (books of
grievance) which on many occasions deplored the costs and the length of justice.30 Ever since the
beginning of venality, there were many attempts to reduce trial lengths (see, e.g., Jeanclos (1977) on
the projects of judicial reform of Raoul Spifame under the reign of Henri II).
The demise of venality
Venality was removed at the beginning of the Revolution, but we have seen that some kings had
already tried to get rid of it because trials were too long and expensive. This policy shift was also
29According to Fourastié (1950), the maximum annual income of a 18th century laborer was around 150 livres
tournoi.
30Civil trials were comparatively more expensive and lengthier than penal ones (see Bouloiseau and Cheronnet
(1971), p. 139).
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the unintended consequence of the sale of thousands of judicial offices over the years as well as of
the rise in the size of the kingdom, in particular after Louis XIV’conquests. As offices were sold to
people with more and more disparate backgrounds (in terms of values, skills, geographical origins,
and so on) new officers tended to hold different views on justice than the King’s. Moreover, the new
components of the kingdom were allowed to keep many parts of their legal systems. Legal diversity
was continually on the rise, resulting in what Carbasse (2014) calls a “normative abundance" (p.
219). Therefore, the judges of the new territories also tended to hold different views on justice to
the King’s. This evolution can be interpreted in the model as a change both in the size of the country
and in the distribution of judges’ natural inclinations to favor the plaintiff. Proposition 3 shows that
when the country grows bigger and jugdes’ characteristics vary more, the cost of venality rises for
the ruler.
But this cost further increased because legal diversity came to be thought of as abnormal, especially
during the 18th century (Crettez et al. (2018)). Indeed, law was no longer seen as a natural social
fact, but as an institution that needed to be designed rationally and in this respect legal diversity was
perceived as arbitrary. We can interpret this new view as an increase in ψ , which directly makes
venality less appealing.
For these reasons, it was relatively easy to change the legal regime when the Revolution began. The
country was ready to adopt a judicial system in which judges were public servants paid by the state,
and where legal rules were made uniformed, the better control adjudication.
6 Conclusion
While office venality may seem a strange institution (or even a “weird” institution, in the sense
of Leeson (2017)), this paper contributes to the understanding of its rationality in terms of legal
design and creation of state capacity. Venality can be a useful institution for a state lacking fiscal
resources, or/and without opportunity to borrow, and it was instrumental in the development of
several European states.
We have proposed a model of venal judicial offices which builds on a version of the canonical
model of litigation with optimistic litigants. We have analyzed how the ruler and the judges share
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the trial fees. We have specifically studied the optimal value of the share accruing to the ruler. We
have argued that the final demise of the venality system can be accounted for by increased diversity
in judges’ preferences (reflected in the model by their natural propensity to favor the plaintiff).
Venality was no longer an efficient way of extracting resources from the common people. It was,
however, politically costly to remove it, which is why it took no less than a Revolution to achieve.
Our analysis provides new insights into modern legal design. That is because, many countries still
find it extremely difficult to tax and to borrow, and hence cannot develop state capacity. Venality can
be thought of as an intermediate institution that can overcome initial funding constraints. Whether
some modern forms of venality can, at least in part, alleviate the financial difficulties faced by some
countries is a natural topic for further research.
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A On the price of a judicial office and the tax levy φ on trial
fees
Let Po be the price of a judicial office, ( ft)t the stream of fees associated with this office and
(gt)t the stream of payments received from the ruler. Assume for simplicity that the time horizon
decision of a would-be judge is infinite and that the interest rate is constant across time.31 Under








For simplicity, let us assume that ft and gt are also constant across time. Then the above inequality
reads
rPo ≤ f +g. (21)
The time period net gain of an office buyer can be written: f +g− rPo. Denoting by φ =
rPo−g
f
the net share of fees accruing to the ruler, we have
f +g− rPo = f (1−φ). (22)








This price is equal to the discounted sum of the gages value and the share φ of the trial costs.
Therefore, one can analyse judicial venality by focusing only on the determination of the value of φ .
31An infinite decision-horizon is relevant particularly when judicial offices can be bequeathed.
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B Proofs
































Proof. First of all, the objective function is continuous with respect to φ , therefore by the Weierstrass










2 f (pi)d pi (25)
From Proposition 1 we have pe(pi) = pi +
(1−φ)















(pe(pi)− pR) f (pi)d pi. (26)
Again using Proposition 1, we obtain the Proposition after a little algebra.
Proposition 3 Assume that F and G have the same means. Therefore the effect of an enlarged















−ψ (LVG(pi)−VF(pi)) . (27)
Proof. First of all, since the means of the distribution functions F and G are equal, from Proposition
2 we deduce that an increase in kingdom size from 1 to L leaves the optimal value of φ unchanged.

























2 f (pi)d pi.
From there we obtain the Proposition after a little algebra.
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